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Abstract
A reconstructive approach to memory for connected discourse is
contrasted with orientations that emphasize passive reproduction
(possibly preceded by inferential elaboration at comprehension). Con-
ditions under which reconstructive errors in recall should occur are
specified. Most conventional experiments do not satisfy the condi-
tions. When subjects are induced not to differentiate information
in discourse from prior knowledge, and when subsequently presented
information contradicts expectations formed earlier, predicted recon-
ciling recall errors from an a priori generated set tend to be mani-
fest. This tendency increases with delay prior to recall. Such
recall errors are almost totally absent when schematic states at recall
do not contradict earlier states and when conventional memory instruc-
tions are employed. These results support the reconstructive theory
presented. A preliminary sketch of a model of inferential reconstruc-
tion is also presented.
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Bartlett (1932) found that reproductions of stories were character-
ized by substantial error, including distortions of old information and
importation of new information. These results led Bartlett to conclude
that memory for connected discourse involves something more than passive
reproduction of stored memories. He hypothesized that to-be-remembered
(TBR) information is assimilated into pre-existing holistic cognitive
structures (schemata) in such a manner as to lose particular identity.
New information which subsequently modifies those schemata exerts a greater
determining force in the schemata than the assimilated TBR information.
Recall under this dual handicap is problematic. Bartlett's solution was
to propose a process of "turning round upon one's schemata." Although the
latter concept has been considered to be obscure and non-operational (e.g.,
Oldfield & Zangwill, 1942), it seems likely that Bartlett intended some
kind of reconstruction mechanism in which past states of schemata are
inferred on the basis of current states. Furthermore, the process can, in
principle, be specified so as to have greater empirical content.
However, subsequent research on memory for connected discourse (e.g.,
Gomulicki, 1956; Johnson, 1970; Meyer, 1974; Meyer & McConkie, 1973;
Spencer, 1973) has completely failed to replicate Bartlett's finding of
substantial gross error in recall. Substance accuracy (other than omis-
sions) was so prevalent in the study by Gomulicki (1956) that he formulated
what can be called an "abstractive-trace retrieval" theory. Comprehen-
sion of discourse includes an active process of forming (constructing) a
selective summary or prdcis. Once the discourse is comprehended the basis
for subsequent recall is set. The experience will then have a particular
Inferential Reconstruction
5
identity immune from the assimilative effects of one's knowledge or related
experiences in the future, with recall depending on the passive re-excita-
tion of appropriate traces and forgetting attributable to some unspecified
process of loss of traces (depending on the "structural Importance" of
individual elements). In addition to the many studies showing substance
accuracy in recall, this view also receives support from the common finding
of "freezing effects" in discourse recall. If multiple reproductions are
required, a very high degree of persistence of content is found (e.g.,
Bartlett, 1932; Howe, 1970; Meyer, 1974; Spencer, 1973), even when the
original passage is repeatedly reinstated (Frederiksen, 1975a,b; Kay,
1955).
It is contended here that all post-Bartlett research and theory
dealing with memory for connected discourse adheres (explicitly or implic-
itly) to an approach which emphasizes passive reproduction at recall
rather than active reconstruction. The main thrust of research has been
concerned with the criterion problem--how should discourse memory be
measured? The solutions have progressed from number of words recalled
allowing synonym substitution, to recall of sections of passages comprising
completed ideas (with methods of such passage subdivision ranging from
the unorganized intuitions of the experimenter to complex hierarchical
structures, e.g., Crothers, 1972), to scoring based on complex discourse
analysis derived from linguistic theory (e.g., Meyer, 1972; Kintsch, 1974).
Research based on all these scoring methods have had, with few excep-
tions, one common result: a remarkable faithfulness to the original
material in recall. The probability of occurrence of importations of
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information from outside the presented discourse, distortions of presented
information, and other gross errors of the kind Bartlett reported approaches
zero. This consensus on the substantive accuracy of prose recall has led
contemporary researchers to employ the following modus operandi. A method
of discourse analysis is devised, frequently independent of consideration
of individuals' knowledge acquired prior to presentation and always inde-
pendent of subsequently acquired knowledge (an important determinant of the
overall, gross nature of recall in the reconstructive approach). Hypothe-
ses are tested regarding which aspects, derived from the method of analy-
sis, tend to be recalled more or less often. For example, elements of
discourse have been shown to be recalled better when they have greater
structural importance (e.g., Johnson, 1970) or when the ideas have a more
superordinate position in the discourse's hierarchy (e.g., Meyer & McConkie,
1973). Alternatively, aspects of recall which are deviations from the
a priori discourse analysis are anticipated but either do not occur with
substantial frequency (Spencer, 1973) or are attributed to initial proces-
sing only (Frederiksen, 1975a,b).
These kinds of studies will be referred to as supporting the "abstrac-
tive-trace" retrieval theory of discourse memory mentioned earlier. Compre-
hension results in a particular abstract representation of the text (not
to be confused with the less general use by Gomulicki, 1956, of "abstrac-
tive" to refer to the precis-like quality of recall) which, though selec-
tive, does not change with time (other than becoming sparser), with recall
consisting of passive retrieval of specific stored memories (elements of
the initial representation). The abstractive-trace retrieval approach
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should be contrasted with the assimilative-holistic schema, tendency to
gross error in recall, and active, inferential, non-reactivation-of-specific-
stored-memories characteristics of reconstructive approaches. With the
exception of Bartlett's data, all memory for connected discourse results
are of the abstractive-trace type. Taking account of the weight of the
evidence in favor of abstractive-trace retrieval theory, Zangwill (1972)
concluded that the emphasis in memory research and theory should be on
reproduction rather than reconstruction. Regarding Bartlett, he said "the
theory, in my view never very plausible, is best forgotten" (Zangwill, 1972,
p. 127). Zangwill's remarks characterize the current state of the art
with respect to the role of reconstruction in memory for connected discourse.
Note should be made of some recent research also using the concept of
"construction." The seminal paper by Bransford, Barclay, and Franks (1972)
is prototypal of this research. Bransford et al. provide support for the
contention that subjects use sentences to form descriptions of situations
which may contain more information than a purely linguistic analysis would
provide. The extra semantic information in the constructive approach is
purported to be the result of some process of interaction with prior know-
ledge. In this regard, Bransford et al.'s orientation is clearly seen to
coincide with Bartlett's effort after meaning and schema assimilation.
Their results are clearly consistent with a constructive approach to
language comprehension. However, it should also be clear that Bransford
et al.'s research does not address the question of the roles of active re-
construction versus passive reproduction in recall. Their results are not
inherently inconsistent with the passive abstractive-trace retrieval approach
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to recall. The same caveat, regarding interpretation of data purported to
indicate construction in memory, applies to similar sentence recall re-
search (e.g., Barclay, 1973; Honeck, 1973) as well as Frederiksen's (1975a,b)
research on connected discourse. Frederiksen found evidence of construc-
tion only at the comprehension stage, even though experimental manipulations
intended to detect construction at recall were included in his research.
It will be argued below that evidence of construction at recall of the kind
Frederiksen was seeking would not be predicted to occur given the condi-
tions of his experiments. In order to reduce ambiguity, elaborative pro-
cesses involved in comprehension will be referred to as "construction",
active inferential processes at recall as "reconstruction." The emphasis
in recent years has clearly been on construction.
The apparent failure to obtain empirical support for the reconstruc-
tive approach to recall, it will be contended here, is the result of various
characteristics of conventional laboratory memory experiments which conspire
to minimize the likelihood that overt evidence of reconstructive errors
could be manifest. Essentially, the problem is that most researchers assume
that the reconstructive approach predicts substantial error in recall in
all situations. Actually, it seems to the present writer that constructive
theory predicts error in recall only under certain specifiable conditions.
First, reconstruction using inference must be required. In principle,
if novel information was used primarily to develop a new schema, i.e., was
differentiated from pre-existing schemata, and that schema was not modified
by subsequent related information, then a constructive approach should pre-
dict accuracy in recall (other than omissions). If, however, TBR information
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is related to pre-existing schemata, with the predicted assimilation and
resulting loss of particular identity, inferential reconstruction would
be required. To the extent that the inferential process is incapable of
differentiating the TBR information from the prior knowledge, error in
recall could occur. Although more error is predicted in this case than
when information is used to form a new schema, the magnitude of the differ-
ence should not be great. This is because of the probable schema-dominance
of chronologically recent information.
The problem of recall becomes significantly greater when TBR informa-
tion is related to a schema which is subsequently altered by encounter
with information also related to that schema. Dominance due to chronologi-
cal recency is lost, and recall is under the influence of a schema dominated
by other factors. This fact, combined with the assimilative nature of
schemata, leads to the strong possibility that the current state of the
schema at recall will be in some sense inconsistent with the past state of
the schema at the time of comprehension of the TBR information. Recon-
struction then requires inferring the past state of the schema on the basis
of the present, different state of the schema. It is in this situation
that substantial error in recall becomes probable. To summarize, evidence
of reconstructive errors in recall of connected discourse is likely to be
found to the extent of interaction with cognitive structures with loss of
particular identity, and to the extent of subsequent schema-modifications
with resulting difference between present and past schema states. Schema
changes due to subsequent modifications will have by far the greater effect
on producing reconstructive errors at delayed recall. The preceding
Inferential Reconstruction
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orientation will be referred to as the Reconstructive Theory.
Recall which is apparently of the abstractive-trace retrieval type
is to be expected when the above conditions are not met. It will be argued
that all of the memory for connected discourse experiments, with the excep-
tion of one set, induced minimal interaction with cognitive structures.
The one set that did manipulate likely schema interaction (Frederiksen,
1975a,b) did not have any subsequent schema modifications. Frederiksen's
results are consistent with the present interpretation as will be shown
below. The common outcome that error in recall is minimal, suggesting that
the memories for individual discourses maintain a particular identity
immune from the assimilative effects of knowledge (in most of the research)
and future related experiences (in all of the researchf)would therefore
not be surprising.
It will be argued that subjects in conventional memory experiments
minimally interact with pre-existing schemata when comprehending TBR connec-
ted discourse, and that any information subsequently encountered is either
not likely to be related to the schemata of the TBR material or will not
even be relatable. When one considers the demand characteristics of experi-
mental situations (Orne, 1962), one of the most prominent is that subjects
desire to perform in such a manner as to reflect positively on themselves.
The norm of self-presentation in memory experiments is simply to get as
high a recall score as possible. If assimilation into pre-existing schemata
leads to inaccuracy in recall, subjects would therefore be motivated to
increase the dissociability of the TBR information from other cognitive
structures (e.g., by focusing on details as Gauld and Stephenson's (1967)
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and Kay's (1955) subjects did).
Why should a research subject integrate the TBR information with his
or her other knowledge? The role the information will play in his or her
life can be summarized as follows: take in the information, hold it for
some period of time, give it back to the experimenter in as close to the
original form as possible, and then forget it forever. The information
can not be perceived as anything but useless to the subject in his or her
everyday life (given the common employment of esoteric or clearly fictional
topics as stimulus materials). The information, even when not clearly
fictional, is probably not true. In any case, the subject knows that the
relative truth of the information has nothing to do with the purpose of the
experiment. The perceived function of new information is normally to
selectively update one's knowledge (Bransford & McCarrell, 1975). One
usually selects aspects of discourse on the basis of such factors as inter-
est, and uses the information to alter the relevant cognitive structures
in such a way as to make them reflect what has been derived from.the new
information. However, it would clearly be absurd and counter-productive
to update one's knowledge with the useless, isolated, and probably false
information presented in laboratory memory experiments. Furthermore,
given the norm of self-presentation of high recall performance, the role
of selectivity on the basis of interest is lessened. All of the elements
of the TBR discourse are important for a high recall score. The high score
is best accomplished by relating the elements to each other rather than
relating elements to pre-existing cognitive structures. This may be one
reason that recall predictions based entirely on intra-passage relations
Inferential Reconstruction
12
(e.g., Meyer & McConkie, 1973) are so effective. In any case, the likely
result is accuracy in recall.
An aspect of Gauld and Stephenson's (1967) discourse memory research
of interest was their finding that (nonverbatim) accuracy in prose recall
was positively correlated with conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was
ascertained in clinical interviews focusing on such factors as anxiety
about approval of other people and altruism. Accuracy in recall was not
correlated with intelligence (a very common finding with a long history).
In other words, superior recall performance was more likely by subjects with
an "unselfish interest in the welfare of others" than by those more intelli-
gent. This makes one wonder further what role demand characteristics of
the experimental situation may be playing in producing abstractive-trace
retrieval results.
It is well-known that subjects in experiments act as problem-solvers
trying to determine how the experimenter wants them to act. It is also
well established that subjects usually try to cooperate; i.e., they try to
act the way they think the experimenter wants them to (Orne, 1962). In
this context, it seems plausible that the conscientious subjects in a
laboratory experiment think the experimenter does not want idiosyncrasy in
their prose recall, that scientific studies are trying to get at pure
effects with.as little between-subject variance as possible (this possibil-
ity is increased the further the subject is into the introductory psychology
course). If this does occur, that would be further motivation to minimize
"effort after meaning." Some support for the contention that this impres-
sion is indeed a common one is indicated by the results of the following
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questionnaire. Students in introductory educational psychology courses
at the Pennsylvania State University and at the University of Illinois,
and introductory psychology students at the Pennsylvania State University
were asked the following question:
Picture yourself in the following situation:
You are participating in an experiment. You are presented
with a passage to read. You are either told that it is a memory
experiment and you will have to recall the passage, or you are
fairly certain that you will have to recall the passage even
though you have not been explicitly told. Do you think the ex-
perimenter would prefer that you a) keep the information in the
passage separate in your mind from other knowledge you may have
(so that the results would be "pure," that is unconfounded by
idiosyncratic differences between individuals), or b) integrate
the information in the passage with your pre-existing knowledge
by doing things like relating the information to personal expe-
riences, thinking of implications of the information, etc.?
Among those who had a clear opinion on the question, 44 out of 72 (60%)
chose choice (a); i.e., they thought experimenters would prefer that the
to-be-remembered information be kept separate so that "purer" results
would obtain. This proportion choosing (a) differs significantly from .5
(z = 1.65, p < .05). However, even if these speculations on the demand
characteristics of memory experiments and their effects are not totally
correct, it will be argued that the basis for most of the interaction
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with cognitive structures in everyday comprehension of discourse is missing
in the isolated context of memory experiments.
Before proceeding, however, an important qualification should be noted.
The present thesis is n6t that there is no interaction with cognitive struc-
tures in prose memory experiments. Linguists and psychologists are coming
to accept the premise that prose comprehension, even in isolated contexts,
frequently requires the use of some information external to that actually
present in the to-be-comprehended linguistic message. For example, Lakoff
(1971) argues that "a sentence will be well-formed only with respect to
certain assumptions about the nature of the world" (Lakoff, 1971, p. 329).
In this framework, linguistic competence includes the ability to pair
sentences with the presuppositions necessary for well-formedness. Bransford
and Johnson (1972) demonstrated that comprehension sometimes depends on
extralinguistic contextual information, and that the context must be activa-
ted during the comprehension process for it to have a facilitative effect.
Looked at another way, it shows that some interaction with pre-existing
schemata (effort after meaning) will probably always be helpful and sometimes
it will be a necessity for comprehension and efficient memory.
The present point of contention is that the effort after meaning in
the prose memory experiment is a lazy one, stopping as soon as sufficient
relations to knowledge outside of the TBR material have been made to enable
a plausible non-contradictory semantic reading. Consider the following
passage:
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"If the balloons popped, the sound wouldn't be able
to carry since everything would be too far away from
the correct floor. A closed window would also prevent
the sound from carrying, since most buildings tend to
be well insulated. Since the whole operation depends
on a steady flow of electricity, a break in the middle
of the wire would also cause problems. Of course, the
fellow could shout, but the human voice is not loud
enough to carry that far. An additional problem is
that a string could break on the instrument. Then
there could be no accompaniment to the message. It
is clear that the best situation would involve less
distance. Then there would be fewer potential pro-
blems"(Bransford & Johnson, 1972, p. 719).
Clearly it is difficult to assign some kind of semantic representation to
the passage. Now picture a guitarist standing by an apartment house holding
onto balloons which are carrying an amplifier and a monkey up to the up-
stairs windows. This update of the organ-grinder's monkey provides a con-
text necessary for comprehension of the passage (as did Bransford and
Johnson's "modern-day Romeo" context). However, if the passage is read
in an experimental situation, you do not think about its implications; how
does it relate to what you have been thinking about recently, e.g., re-
garding the economic situation and Ford? It would not occur to you to ask:
"Did it really happen?", "Will it happen by my apartment?", "So my wife
was right about putting up storm windows?". If you were to come across
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the passage and accompanying picture in everyday life, it would occur in
some context which would contribute to its meaning for you. Just as you
cannot specify all the particularized meanings of a word in isolation
(e.g., Anderson & Ortony, 1975), a sentence, paragraph, or story depends
on context to some extent for its particularized idiosyncratic representa-
tion. You might have seen the passage and picture in Business Week accom-
panying an article on unemployed aerospace engineers and it would mean
something different than if you saw the same materials in a magazine for
electrical hobbyists, which would mean something still different than if
you saw it in either of those places and you were President of the A.S.P.C.A.
and worried about monkeys dangling in the air. Additionally, most situa-
tions have some kind of communication function, and part of comprehension
involves trying to figure out the speaker's intentions. If your butcher
showed you the passage and picture, clipped from a magazine, while you
were paying for your porkchops, you would not stop with the semantic inter-
pretation that subjects are forced to stop with in Bransford and Johnson's
experiment. You would wonder why he was showing it to you and what he was
trying to get at. The meaning of the situation to you (and what you might
remember about it) might be that the butcher is probably going to raise
prices because times are bad. All of these behaviors would involve relating
the discourse to prior knowledge to a far greater degree than subjects in
a Bransford and Johnson-type experiment are likely to. In the isolated
context of the laboratory experiment there is no basis for any of the
additional interactions with pre-existing schemata (prerequisite for recon-
structive errors) illustrated above. Any effort after meaning beyond the
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minimum required for simple comprehension would be impossible or at least
unwarranted in the laboratory situation.
Factors which contribute to variation in the meaning (or significance
or "aboutness") of the same discourse include the following: prior lin-
guistic context (never present in memory experiments); the context of the.
situation (where one is when exposed to the discourse); knowledge about the
communicator (e.g., inferences about shared presuppositions, expectations
which influence comprehension, etc.), necessary for determining the communi-
cative function of the discourse and the communicator's intentions (not to
be confused with the more basic "illocutionary force," Austin, 1962, which
is probably a factor in all comprehension; for example the sentence "Can you
open the door" would probably be interpreted by adults as synonymous with
"I would like you to open the door" in most contexts); and attitudes of the
receiver of the communication. All of these factors lead to greater inter-
action with pre-existing schemata. It is unusual for any of these factors
to be operative in conventional memory experiments in any way relating to
the topical content of the TBR discourse.
The point is that the context of the prose in a memory experiment is
the experiment itself. If the material interacts with any pre-existing
schemata (other than to achieve a minimal plausible semantic representation),
they are probably those dealing with experiences and expectations of labora-
tory experiments, science, etc. This becomes the context by default in the
isolated experiment. In other words any effort after meaning will not be
directed along lines related to the topical content of the TBR discourse,
but toward solving the problem of what the experimenter wants. It is very
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unlikely once again that such experiences and expectations, or that any
subsequent modifications of the laboratory experiments/science schemata
will bear directly on the topical content of the TBR material. In summary,
the topical content is not assimilated primarily into any content-related
schemata. Further, it is likely to be the most recent addition to whatever
schemata it is primarily related to (since schema interaction based on the
topic of the discourse is minimal, subsequent schema modifications due to
exposure to related information will have no effect; if the material is
fictional, subsequent schema modification is impossible). Finally, the
topical content is part of a not very extensive schemata (if it is part of
any pre-existing schemata at all). Given these conditions, "freezing
effects" and abstractive absence of intrusions in recall would be expected
(given the conditions necessary for inferential reconstruction to produce
error in recall outlined above).
Accuracy in recall and stability in repeated reproductions are consis-
tent with the inferential reconstruction hypothesis when interaction with
cognitive structures (and the resultant loss of particular identity) is
minimal and, particularly when relevant schemata are not subsequently modi-
fied so as to have states at recall dissimilar to the states of the schemata
at comprehension. The demand characteristics of the experimental situation,
the nature of the experimental materials, and the isolated context in which
the TBR discourses are presented all combine to predict the kind of results
found throughout the literature on memory for connected discourse (with
the exception of Bartlett, whose results will be explained in the context
of the present orientation).
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In the one set of discourse studies in which probable degree of cogni-
tive interaction was manipulated (Frederiksen, 1975a,b), there were more
deviations from the text in recall by subjects in-the high cognitive inter-
action condition (subjects were supposed to try to solve the problems of
a fictional island described in the target passage). This result would be
predicted by Reconstructive Theory. Furthermore, since the subjects were
unlikely to receive schema-altering information about Circle Island on
their own during the retention intervals, and Frederiksen did not provide
any, the reconstructive model would predict that in repeated reproductions
with associated reinstatements of the original passage, the same amount of
error would reoccur. Frederiksen's data concurred with this prediction.
This is because the schemata which were originally related to and which
contributed to the initial comprehension with the resultant errors were
unaltered, i.e., each recall was based on cognitive structures in essentially
the same state. Frederiksen's expectation was that if errors were not
reduced after reinstatement of the original it would indicate construction
only at comprehension, but if they were reduced it would indicate low confi-
dence "gap-filling." Such an interpretation ignores the possibility of
a normal, high confidence process of inferential reconstruction based on
holistic, cumulative schemata, rather than the conscious fabrication of
information known not to be correct. In any case, Frederiksen's conclusion
that construction is limited to the comprehension stage only is consistent
with Reconstructive Theory, given the absence of schema modification. In
essence, Frederiksen's research deals only with one aspect (viz., construc-
tion at comprehension) of the more complete Reconstructive Theory. The
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latter theory, in the form outlined earlier has never received an experi-
mental (i.e., manipulative) test.
a Paradigm for the Investigation of Inferential Reconstruction in Memory
for Connected Discourse
It is expected that reconstructive error in recall can be manifest
when TBR connected discourse is related to pre-existing schemata and there-
by assimilated with a loss of particular identity, and especially when the
discourse information has been assimilated into schemata that are, in turn,
subsequently modified by new information such that their current states
at recall conflict with their states at comprehension.
In attacking the problem of an empirical test of the reconstruction
hypothesis one thing becomes immediately clear: it can not be solved using
the conventional approach, i.e., by looking at the proportion of recall
consisting of importations, distortions, and rationalizations, or by looking
at the proportion of a repeated reproduction that is changed from the
previous reproduction. What proportion importations is necessary to indi-
cate constructive processes? Clearly, meaningful demarcation criteria
cannot be specified arbitrarily; therefore, this method of analysis is a
dead end. As an alternative, reconstructive processes in recall may be
demonstrated by taking advantage of known regularities in cognitive struc-
tures to systematically predict the kinds of changes in recall that are
most likely to occur due to subsequent new inputs to those cognitive struc-
tures if recall is indeed reconstructive and not tied to fixed, lifeless
traces.
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The approach taken here is to construct a situation about which sub-
jects would have some consistent expectations and present the situation
to them. They are subsequently provided with ancillary information about
the situation which, in some conditions, contradicts the expectations the
subjects were likely to have (but which does not contradict or interfere
with any elements physically present in the TBR prose material). It is
expected that, as time passes, the ancillary information will be assimila-
ted with the TBR story into relevant schemata regarding such situations.
If Reconstructive Theory is correct, when the material later has to be
recalled, it will be inferentially reconstructed on the combined basis of
the originally presented prose passage, the contradictory ancillary informa-
tion, and schematic knowledge of what happens in the relevant type of
situation. This will lead to predictable changes and additions to the
original prose passage resulting from the combined effect of the three
factors on which the inferential reconstruction is presumably based.
Specifically, stories were constructed which were expected to be rele-
vant to subjects' underlying knowledge or schemata of how human relation-
ships are affected by various kinds of events. The situation described
(among other things) an engaged couple in which the man was having doubts
about discussing a very important issue--he does not ever want to have
children. When the matter is finally discussed, he either finds out that
his fiancee agrees with him, feeling just as strongly as he does about not
having children, or he finds out that she wants very much to have children.
The elements of these stories are grossly representable using a structural
balance model (Heider, 1958) in which the former situation is balanced and
la
BALANCED
BOB(P) MARGIE(O);,-,-- ...--- ,
1 /
V
HAVING CHILDREN(X)
HAVING CHILDREN(X)
Ib
IMBALANCED
P) E(O)
HAVING CHILDREN(X)
POSITIVE RELATION
---- NEGATIVE RELATION
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the latter is imbalanced. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the
elements in the balance model actually presented in this part of the
story: the positive affective relationship of Bob to Margie, the negative
relationship between Bob and "having children," and a negative (Figure la)
or positive (Figure Ib) relationship between Margie and "having children."
Insert Figure 1 about here
Balanced triads contain zero or two negative relationships, imbalanced
triads contain one or three. It was assumed that the state of balance or
imbalance was derivable from each subject's prior knowledge regarding inter-
personal relations and would consistently engender a general positive or
negative expectation (for balanced and imbalanced stories, respectively)
regarding Bob and Margie's relationship.
Subsequently, subjects are incidentally provided with the ancillary
information that either a) Bob and Margie did get married and are still
living together happily, or b) Bob and Margie eventually broke off the
engagement and have not seen each other since (referred to as "married"
and "unmarried," respectively). For those who received the balanced story,
the outcome "married" is ancillary information which is "consistent" with
the expectation derived on the basis of the story and prior knowledge re-
garding interpersonal relations. The outcome "unmarried" for the balanced
story is ancillary information "contradictory" with the gross expectation
predicted by the balance model. On the other hand, consistency of the
ancillary information with the expectation for those receiving the imbalanced
story is reversed: "married" is contradictory and "unmarried" is now
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consistent. Since the state of balance in the story interacts with the
ancillary information to determine whether the latter is consistent or
contradictory, the results will be general and not specific to "married"
and "unmarried."
Reconstructive Theory predicts that for subjects in a "cognitive
interaction" condition (i.e., subjects who are told that the story is true,
that the experiment is investigating "changes over time in personal reac-
tions to situations involving interpersonal relations," and that they
should think about the story and react to it), schemata concerning knowledge
of how interpersonal relations usually work will be activated and the in-
formation in the story will be related to those schemata. Subjects are told
at recall that the experimenter is not interested in their reactions, and
that it is, in fact, purely a memory experiment. Memory of the story will
then be inferentially reconstructed in a predictable way based on three
integrated factors, i.e., factors having fuzzy or no boundaries or particu-
lar identities: accessible elements of the presented story, the ancillary
information, and the activated schematic knowledge regarding interpersonal
relations.
When either no ancillary information or consistent ancillary informa-
tion is received by subjects, the reconstructive model would predict basic
accuracy in recall. If anything, consistent ancillary information may
reinforce existent schemata leading to slight errors in the direction of
heightening the degree of balance in balanced stories and the degree of
imbalance in imbalanced stories.
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However, when subjects are presented with contradictory ancillary
information (i.e., "married" after imbalanced stories or "unmarried" after
balanced stories), recall will be problematic. The subject will have to
base his recall on schemata which have been modified in a significant way--
an overall evaluation of Bob and Margie as having a favorable relationship
changed to a state in which the relationship is unfavorable (or vice versa).
If reconstruction requires inference about an earlier schematic state
based on current schematic states, and the current schematic state is in-
consistent with the earlier one, then recall should tend to be erroneous
in the direction of producing reconciliation of the conflicting elements.
Thus, errors in recall (for contradictory ancillary information subjects)
should lessen the degree of balance (i.e., should be imbalancing) for those
who read the balanced story, and the errors should lessen the degree of
imbalance (i.e., should be balancing) for those who read the imbalanced
story. For example, the extent of Bob and Margie's disagreement (in the
imbalanced story) might be remembered as less severe than it actually was
or even nonexistent.
These predicted errors in recall can be specified a priori. A finite
list of balancing and imbalancing error types has been generated (see
Table 1) using the three elements and their inter-relations in the balance
triads of Figure 1. Again, errors of the balancing kind are predicted for
the "contradictory" subjects who read the imbalanced story. The errors
consist of changes or distortions of inter-element relations, addition of
relations not specified in the original story, or importations of informa-
tion which explicitly supersedes the presented balance triad. Table 1
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also gives examples of the different kinds of errors.
Insert Table 1 about here
These predicted errors in recall should not be confused with conscious
fabrication to fill gaps in memory. Rather, the errors are seen as the
outcome of a fallible process which is the essential mode of operation in
memory. If the errors are conscious fabrications, subjects should be able
to detect them, as they did in Gauld and Stephenson (1967). In that experi-
ment, the errors probably were just guesses. The conditions of that experi-
ment were such that Reconstructive Theory would not predict any normal
reconstruction-based errors. If, however, the errors in the present experi-
ment are not conscious fabrications, then it should be hard for subjects
to detect them as errors. Since the "predicted" errors (i.e., the a priori
specified changes in the balance triad) are produced by the same process
of inferential reconstruction, in the same specific reconstructive act, and
based on the same underlying schemata as the correct aspects of recall,
the predicted constructive errors should be undifferentiable from the
correct aspects of recall. The prediction, then, is that subjects' expressed
confidence in predicted errors should not be less than their confidence
in correct aspects of recall (considering only subjects in "cognitive
interaction--contradictory ancillary information" conditions). Actually,
the constructive errors have a more firm basis in the underlying schemata
(being constructed using the subjects' own rules for organizing the world)
than does most of the information in the original passage (which is arbi-
trarily provided to the subject, rather than being initially generated by
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him/herself). If this is the case, confidence in predicted constructive
error could increase relative to confidence in correct aspects as the
retention interval increases and assimilation proceeds, with the former
eventually becoming greater than the latter.
It is hypothesized that schematic assimilation increases with time.
Therefore all of the predicted effects regarding constructive errors in
recall should increase as delay prior to recall increases.
It should be noted that the reconstructive approach makes no predic-
tions regarding the quantity of errors that will occur in recall. A single
constructive error can reconcile the information from the story with contra-
dictory ancillary information. Therefore, number of recall errors will not
be used as a criterion variable in the main data analysis.
On the other hand, when subjects read the stories in the context of a
conventional memory experiment, the arguments of Reconstructive Theory
lead to the expectation that memory for the stories will be maximally
differentiated from pre-existing schemata (thereby lessening the activation
and participation of prior knowledge regarding interpersonal relations)
and protected from assimilation with the ancillary information. The pre-
diction, therefore, is that recall under memory conditions will be basically
accurate. In particular, the constructive errors predicted for the "cogni-
tive interaction-contradictory" condition will not occur in the "memory-
contradictory" condition.
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Method
Subjezts were randovily assigned to one of 36 treatment conditions
determined by the factorial combination of four between-subject factors:
instructional set (cognitive interaction or memory); story (balanced or
imbalanced); ancillary information (none, "married," or "unmarried"); and
delay prior to recall (2 days, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks). In the first session,
the story was read and subjects received the ancillary information. In
the second session, subjects recalled the story and rated their confidence
in the various elements of their recalls.
Subjects
Three hundred ninety-four students from introductory courses in educa-
tional psychology and psychology served as subjects. They received extra
credit toward their course grade for participating (only if they attended
both sessions). Thirty-four subjects were eliminated from the analysis so
that sample sizes for all conditions would equal the sample size (ten) for
the smallest group. No more than two subjects were eliminated from any
condition. Elimination of subjects was done randomly within conditions
(with two exceptions noted below when sex was considered). The reason for
eliminating subjects was mainly that ipitial assignment to conditions was
unequal due to failures to keep appointments for the first session. Tele-
phone reminders and the fact that credit for the first session was given
only if the second session was attended kept the rate of reappearance for
the second session (where recall was solicited) near 100%. The few drop-
outs were randomly scattered across experimental conditions. There were
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209 males and 151 females in the final analysis. In none of the experi-
mental conditions wbte there fewer than four or greater than seven males.
(In the two cases where there were more than seven males in a condition,
sample size was greater than ten and subjects were randomly eliminated
only from among the males in the condition.) Results of the main analyses
did not differ according to sex.
Materials
The stories were constructed to include the elements and relations
of the structural balance triads in Figure 1. The balanced and imbalanced
stories differ only in the last four sentences. The balanced story is
presented below.
This is a story about Bob and Margie. When they met,
they were both twenty years old and beginning their senior
year in college. Bob was majoring in political science and
Margie in history. They didn't know each other until they
were introduced at a party in a mutual acquaintance's apartment.
Since neither of them was particularly extroverted, and they
knew very few people at the party, they seemed glad to have
each other to talk to. They found some interests they had in
common, and hit it off fairly well. They soon began to see
each other regularly.
After several months, Bob began to think he would like
to marry Margie. He felt he loved her, and he believed the
feeling was reciprocated. Still, he was not sure how she would
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react. Finally, he asked her to marry him. She agreed and
they happily began making plans for their marriage and life
together.
However, Bob's happiness was clouded by his awareness that
there was something important he had to discuss with Margie--
his strong feeling that he did not want to have children. He
avoided bringing the subject up because he didn't want anything
to ruin their relationship. However, he soon realized that he
could not put off the discussion forever. Filled with appre-
hension, he told Margie he had a very important matter to dis-
cuss with her. He anxiously related to her his strong feelings
against having children and awaited her response. Margie was
elated. Because she wanted to have a career, she had also
felt that she didn't want to have children. They rejoiced in
the dissolution of what would have been a very serious problem
for them. A long discussion of the status of their relation-
ship followed.
For the imbalanced story, the last four sentences are replaced by
the following:
Margie was horrified. She had always wanted to be a mother
and had her heart set on having many children. They argued
bitterly over what had become a very serious problem for
them. A long discussion of the status of their relationship
followed.
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The recalls were printed on bright yellow paper. Recalls were made on plain
white paper as were the confidence ratings.
Procedure
Subjects were read the following instructions, which were also printed
on a "consent to participate" form in front of them:
[Memory condition] This is a memory experiment. I am inter-
ested in the effects of delays in recall on the nature of
that recall. You will read a story. At the second session
I will ask you to recall the story as best you can. Are there
any questions?
[Cognitive interaction condition] This is an experiment con-
cerned with changes in the way people react to stories involving
interpersonal relations when there is a delay prior to giving
the reactions. You will read a story about two people. The
story is true in all respects. I knew both of the people and
can vouch for the accuracy of the story. What I would like
you to do is think about and react to the story. At the second
session I will ask you various kinds of questions concerning
your reactions to the story. Are there any questions?
Subjects in all conditions were given three minutes to read the story and
were told to use all the time. The stories were then collected. Approxi-
mately the next eight minutes were spent by the experimenter going over
what to expect in the second session, having the subjects fill out informa-
tion on the consent forms, and instructing the subjects of the importance
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of not discussing the experiment with anyone.
As the experimenter was collecting the consent forms after the eight
minutes, he casually said the following (apparently to fill up the time
during the collection and without apparent purpose) to all subjects except
those in the "none" ancillary information condition:
[Memory condition only] Hey' By the way, I really should let
you in on something. The story you read about Bob and Margie
happens to be true.
[Both memory and cognitive Interaction subjects heard the same
ancillary information after this point.]
["Married"] As it turned out, they did get married and
they are very happy together to this day.
or
["Unmarried"] As it turned out, they never did get
married. The engagement was broken, and they never saw
each other again.
After the consent forms were collected, each of the subjects was randomly
assigned to one of the three delay conditions (two days, three weeks, or
six weeks). Subjects were then reminded that they must show up for the
second session in order to get credit for the first one, asked once again
not to discuss the experiment, and dismissed.
At the second session, "cognitive interaction" subjects were told the
following:
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I have to admit that I have deceived you. This is not a study
of how people react to situations involving interpersonal rela-
tions. It is a study of memory.
[From this point on, what the "memory" subjects heard was the
same as the "cognitive interaction" subjects.)
As you will recall, at the last session you read a story on
a yellow piece of paper. What I would like you to do is to
try to recall the story as best you can. Since you probably
can't remember it exactly, do your best to reproduce as much
of the gist as you can. Include all elements of the story
which come to mind. But I do not want your reactions to or
personal feelings about the story.
The instructions were read a second time and then ten minutes was allowed
for recalling the story.
Subjects were then asked to number each of the sentences in their
recall protocols. For each sentence in their recall they were asked to
rate their "confidence that its meaning was expressed explicitly somewhere
in the story (though not in the same words); inferences which you derived
from the story but not explicitly in the stories should be assigned a
low rating." A nine-point scale was used, with "one" indicating "very
uncertain the meaning of the sentence was explicitly expressed" and "nine"
indicating "absolute certainty the meaning of the sentence was explicitly
expressed." Subjects were instructed to divide compound sentences and
rate the parts individually when their confidence about the parts differed.
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The materials were then collected. The subjects were asked again not
to discuss the experiment and dismissed.
Data Analysis
The primary analyses involved judged determination of the presence
or absence of constructed errors of the types provided on the judging
sheet. Once again, these errors were either balancing or imbalancing.
They involved changes of relations between elements of the structural balance
triad, changes in the relative weights of two relations, addition of unpre-
sented relations, or importation of some information which acts to super-
sede or alter the importance of the balance triad in the presented story.
Examples were given in Table 1. The judging list was essentially similar
in content to Table 1.
Each of the recall protocols was randomly assigned an
identification number which was noted with the subject's
treatment condition on a key. The protocols were then shuffled such that
their order could not be expected to reveal any information about their
treatment condition (except that the protocols were separated on the basis
of whether the balanced or imbalanced story had been read; otherwise
errors would be more difficult to isolate).
All 360 protocols were scored by the experimenter in the following
manner. Elements of recalls judged to be instances from the a priori list
(called "predicted constructive errors") were identified by placing their
sentence number (or numbers) on a scoresheet along with the error score.
Positive numbers in the error scores indicated balancing errors, and nega-
tive numbers indicated imbalancing errors (the positivity and negativity
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of error types were not known to the reliability judges to avoid biasing).
Absolute values of error scores (ranging from one to five; zero was the
score if no predicted errors were detected) were assigned using the fol-
lowing guidelines. Scores of one to three were used when an error was a
change of a presented element (but not an importation of a new one) and
resulted in a divergence from the story which did not change the valence
of any of the relations. Selection of the specific score between one and
three was based on a subjective estimate of the degree of change from the
original. As will be seen, the magnitude of the effects are so large that
they are clearly demonstrated using any scoring method. Scores of four or
five were assigned when errors which changed or distorted the original (but
did not add new information) led to a change in the valence of a relation
in the balance triad (e.g., changed a positive relation to a negative one).
Errors which were the result of importation or addition of new information
not present in the original received error scores between three and five.
A score of three was assigned when the importation did not change the
valence of any relations in the balance triad (i.e., changes in shades of
meaning as above) or did not override or supersede the balance triad. When
importations changed the valence of relations or when importations super-
seded the original balance triad, scores of four or five were assigned
(depending on perceived magnitude of the change).
Constructive error score for an individual subject could have been
determined in a number of different ways. When there is more than one
error but all with the same sign (i.e., all balancing or all imbalancing),
the total score could be the sum (or average) of all the error scores or
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it could simply be the error score of largest absolute value. The latter
basis was used since reconstructive theory predicts only that reconciling
errors will occur. Since a single constructive error can change a triad
from balanced to imbalanced, the number of errors made is not important.
When there are errors of both signs (balancing and imbalancing), a
rare occurrence (particularly for high absolute values), the possibilities
for determining the total score include: summing all the scores; summing
the positive and negative scores with the highest absolute value (i.e.
+3 and -4 would be a total score of -1); average (or sum) of all the posi-
tive scores minus the averages (or sum) of all the negative scores; average
(or sum) of scores only for the sign with the single score of highest
absolute value; or the score with the highest absolute value. Although
all of these measures yield the same consistent and conclusive results, the
results presented will use total scores derived by taking the sum of the
single highest scores with positive and negative signs (i.e., highest
positive score minus the negative score with the highest absolute value).
This is one of the more conservative of the options. Note that omissions
are, in effect, zeroes and therefore count against reconstructive theory
in this experiment.
Reliability of the scoring was ascertained in the following way. Two
judges (paid University of Illinois undergraduates) were familiarized with
the stories, the list of constructive error types, and the scoring system
presented above. One judge selected 20 protocols randomly from the 180
in the "balanced" condition, the other selected 20 from the "imbalanced"
condition. All of the experimental conditions were approximately equally
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represented in the total sample of 40. The experimenter blocked out the
ancillary information if it occurred in recall. The judges then assigned
constructive error scores to the 40 protocols. The "single measurement"
reliability (Miner, 1962, p. 126) is .89 between the three judges (the
third set of scores being the experimenter's scores for the 40 randomly
chosen protocols). In the seven instances (out of 40) of experimenter-
scored fours or fives, thirteen of the fourteen scores by the judges were
also four or five. The other one was a "three." The same sentences were
always selected as being "fours" and "fives." Agreement was slightly less
for errors scored by the experimenter as absolute values between zero and
three. However, in only one protocol was an error score with absolute value
less than three scored as a "four" or "five" by one of the two judges. In
any case, as the analyses that follow demonstrate, the same effects occurred
at a high level of significance whether minimal size of a "substantial"
constructive error is considered to be any absolute value between one and
five (inclusive).
Results and Discussion
The primary analyses Involved the following dependent variables:
constructive error score, absolute value of constructive error score, pre-
sence or absence of substantial constructive error (where "substantial"
is defined as a constructive error score whose absolute value is greater
than or equal to 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in five different analyses), and confi-
dence as a function of correctness vs. incorrectness of recall. Supplemen-
tary analyses follow the primary analyses.
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Constructive Error Scores
A four-way analysis of variance was carried out using the following
between-subject factors: two kinds of instructions ("cognitive inter-
action" and "memory") X three lengths of delay interval (two days, three
weeks, and six weeks) X two kinds of presented stories (balanced and im-
balanced) X three kinds of ancillary information (none, "consistent," and
"contradictory"). The "balanced-married" and "imbalanced-unmarried" com-
binations are "consistent," while "imbalanced-married" and "balanced-
unmarried" combinations are "contradictory." The dependent variable is
constructive error (errors reflecting alterations or additions to the
structural balance triad), the score varying from -5 to +5 with zero indi-
cating no constructive errors (see the Data Analysis section). Negative
scores are imbalancing errors, and positive scores are balancing errors.
Reconstructive theory predicts that substantial constructive error in
recall (high absolute values) should occur only when there is contradictory
ancillary information and only in the cognitive interaction condition.
More specifically, for "cognitive interaction-contradictory" subjects who
read the balanced story, imbalancing errors are predicted (negative con-
structive error scores), and for those who read the imbalanced story,
balancing errors are predicted (positive constructive error scores). Sta-
tistically, these predictions translate into a three-way interaction between
type of story, instructional condition, and type of ancillary information
with the following components: a significant simple interaction for the
"cognitive interaction" condition only between the other two factors; for
"cognitive interaction," significant simple effects of "contradictory" vs.
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both other types of ancillary information (with no difference between "none"
and "consistent") for both story types; and, for "cognitive interaction,"
significant simple effects of story type only for the "contradictory"
condition. Additionally, the three-way Interaction should become more pro-
nounced with increases in the delay interval.
Table 2 presents the mean constructive error scores for each of the
36 conditions.
Insert Table 2 about here
As predicted according to reconstructive theory, there was a signifi-
cant three-way interaction between types of instructions, presented stories,
and ancillary information, F(2,324) = 27.39, p < .00001. The significant
over-all interaction is composed of a highly significant simple interaction
of story and kind of ancillary information for the "cognitive interaction
group," FF(2,324) = 54.30, p < .00001, and a nonsignificant simple inter-
action of those two factors for the "memory" group, F(2,324) = 1.41, p > .10.
Means for the simple effects in the significant simple interaction,
i.e., story X ancillary information for "cognitive interaction" only are
presented in Table 3. Differences between stories are nonsignificant when
Insert Table 3 about here
there is "none" or "consistent" antillary ignformation [F(1,324) < 1 and
F(1,324) = 2.28, p > .05, respectively]. The difference between types of
stories is highly significant for the "contradictory" condition, F(1,324) =
146.15, p < .00001. The simple effects of ancillary information for each
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kind of story type are both significant; F(2,324) = 31.93, p < .001 for
balanced stories, and F(2,324) = 21.92, p < .001, for imbalanced stories.
For both balanced and imbalanced stories, scores for the "none" and "con-
sistent" ancillary information conditions differ (by a Tukey Wholly Signifi-
cant Difference Test with "family-wise" error rate set at .01) from the
"contradictory" condition and do not differ from each other for both kinds
of stories.
Finally, the tendency toward high positive constructive error scores
in the "cognitive interaction--imbalance--contradictory" condition and high
negative score in the "cognitive interaction--balance--contradictory" condi-
tion, with no tendency toward constructive error in any other condition
(the three way interaction) becomes more pronounced at either three or six
week delayed recall than at the two day delay interval. The result is a
significant four-way interaction, F(4,324) = 7.55, p < .025. Looking at
the simple Interaction of instruction, story, and ancillary information
for each delay interval, the results are F(2,324) = 2.00 (p > .10),
F(2,324) = 21.32 (p < .001), and F(2,324) = 10.23 (p < .001) for two days,
three weeks, and six weeks, respectively. Although the results are in
the predicted direction at two days, the interaction becomes considerably
more pronounced when recall is delayed three or six weeks. The slight de-
crease in the F-ratio at six weeks vs. three weeks can be attributed to
an overall increase in forgetting in the memory condition and an increase
in gap-filling evidenced by low confidence in constructive errors by
"memory" subjects and the existence of a couple of substantive balancing
and imbalancing errors in the same memory condition.
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To summarize, all the predictions of Reconstructive Theory were con-
clusively and unambiguously confirmed. In the "cognitive interaction--
contradictory" condition, substantial predicted constructive error occurred.
Examples of constructive errors actually made by subjects in the "cognitive
interaction-contradictory" condition include the following:
"Balancing" errors by subjects reading the imbalanced story:
-- they separated but realized after discussing the matter that
their love mattered more.
-- they underwent counseling to correct the major discrepancy.
- they discussed it and decided they could agree on a compromise:
adoption.
-- she was only a little upset at the disagreement.
"Imbalancing" errors made by subjects reading the balanced story:
- they had had a severe disagreement about having children at
some time prior to their agreeing.
- there was a hassle with one or the other's parents.
- they disagreed about having children.
-- they at no time discussed their attitudes about.having
children with each other out of fear of rejection and this
led them to separate.
As can be seen, these errors are gross distortions of the actual story.
They occur only when Reconstructive Theory predicts they should occur.
The rationale in subsequent analyses for the predicted interactions
is basically the same as in this analysis. Therefore, slightly less expli-
cation will be devoted to them.
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Absolute Value of Constructive Errors
The constructive error score analysis could conceivably have concealed
tendencies in the memory condition to make constructive errors that can-
celled each other out (i.e., the data could have resulted from a lesser
tendency toward making errors of the same sign for a given presented story
in the "memory" condition). To test this possibility, an analysis of vari-
ance with the same four factors as the preceding analysis was executed
using absolute values of the constructive error scores. Table 4 is analo-
gous to Table 2 with the exception of the changed dependent variable.
Insert Table 4 about here
The hypothesis of counter-balancing errors in the memory condition
must be rejected. The interaction of type of instruction and ancillary
information is highly significant, F(2,324) = 14.58, p < .00001. The
simple effects tests show nonsignificant differences between instructional
conditions when no ancillary information was presented as well as when
consistent ancillary information was presented [F(1,324) = 2.79, p > .05
and F < 1, respectively]. However, the absolute value of constructive
error socres is higher for the "cognitive interaction" than for the "memory"
condition when contradictory ancillary information is provided (means of
2.6 and 0.7, respectively). Whereas there is no difference between types
of ancillary information in the "memory" condition (F < 1), the effect is
significant for the "cognitive interaction" condition, F(2,324) = 28.75,
p < .001. Once again, the "none" and "consistent" conditions do not differ
from each other and both differ from the "contradictory" condition which
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has higher constructive error scores (by a Tukey Wholly Significant Differ-
ence test with "family-wise" error rate equal to .01). Also, error scores
increase with delay, F(2,324) = 11.11, p < .0001. Because absolute values
of error scores were used, no effects involving type of story were expected
or found since type of story only influences the sign of the error score.
Also, a three-way interaction with delay was unlikely because mean absolute
constructive error scores were inflated by the addition of low (and less
reliable) scores which had previously tended to cancel each other out.
Likelihood of Substantial Constructive Errors
Thus far it has been demonstrated that higher constructive error scores
(of predicted sign) occur under the conditions predicted by Reconstructive
Theory. The question now considered is whether the same conditions affect
the likelihood of making a substantial, gross reconciling error; i.e.,
will the predictions of reconstructive theory hold, as they do when degree
of error is the dependent variable, when constructive errors are considered
on an all-or-none basis? The problem of defining a "substantial construc-
tive error" was bypassed by analyzing the data using all possible cut-off
points (i.e., five analyses with scores of absolute value > 0, > 1, > 2,
> 3, and > 4 as criteria for deciding that a substantial constructive
error has occurred). As the constructive error score cut-off gets higher
(i.e., as constructive error scores become more reliable and the errors
are judged as more serious departures from the original text), incidence
of constructive errors should become more consistent with the predictions
of reconstructive theory. In particular, constructive errors should occur
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mainly in the "cognitive interaction--contradictory" condition. A few
constructive errors of a reinforcing rather than reconciling nature, e.g.,
balancing errors for balanced stories, might be expected in the two other
cognitive interaction--ancillary information conditions since underlying
schemata are activated. In other words, an interaction between type of
instructions and ancillary information is again predicted. This should
especially be true when "four" or "five" is the cut-off, since these scores
were only to be assigned in cases where errors changed the valence of the
structural balance triad, added relations which altered the state of balance,
or imported information which superseded the triad.
Five analyses of variance were carried out using each of the following
criteria: constructive error scores with absolute values > 0, > 1, > 2,
> 3, and > 4. When the absolute value of a subject's constructive error
score was greater than or equal to the criterion for the given analysis, a
score of "one" was assigned. Otherwise a score of "zero" was assigned.
Analysis of variance with dichotomous data yields Type I error rates almost
identical to those for chi-square tests on the same data (e.g., Dunlap,
1974). Analysis of variance has the advantage of greater facility in
dealing with higher-order interactions.
Table 5 presents the number of constructive errors (a maximum of ten
in each cell) for the criterion "> 3." Under all criteria a significantly
Insert Table 5 about here
greater number of subjects make constructive errors in the "cognitive-
interaction" than in the "memory" condition, and more at the two and three
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week delay intervals than with two-day delay. For all criteria except
"> 0," significantly more subjects make errors in the "contradictory" con-
dition than in the other two ancillary information conditions. Most impor-
tant, for all criteria except "> 0," the type of instruction X ancillary
information interaction is significant (p < .0001 in all four analyses).
In all of the four analyses the prediction was upheld that subjects will
make constructive errors in the "cognitive interaction--contradictory"
condition almost exclusively. This is most clearly illustrated when the
criteria are high. It appears that for any definition of "substantial
constructive error" one may choose with respect to constructive error
scores, the predictions of Reconstructive Theory are supported.
Confidence in Substantial Predicted Constructive Errors Relative to Correct
Aspects of Recall
One of the main contentions of Reconstructive Theory is that construc-
tive errors result from a natural process of assimilation and schema modifi-
cation occurring over time, which all information in memory is potentially
subject to. Constructive errors are hypothesized to be the consequence of
the same process that produces correct recall. Therefore, these kinds of
errors should not be detectable by subjects who make them. These errors
are contrasted with easily detectable conscious fabrications to fill gaps
in memory (Frederiksen, 1975a,b; Gauld & Stephenson, 1967) and errors which
are the result of inferential processing at comprehension only rather than
at recall (Frederiksen, 1975a,b; Gomulicki, 1956).
That the constructive errors detected in this study are not of the
abstractive-trace retrieval type, i.e., they are not the outcome of active
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processing at comprehension followed by particular and static storage and
passive retrieval, is suggested by the increasing incidence of constructive
error with longer delay (see, e.g., Tables 2, 4, or 5). The other possi-
bility, i.e., that the errors are conscious gap-fillers or guesses was
investigated by examining the confidence ratings.
If the latter hypothesis is correct (i.e., the errors are guesses),
the subject should indicate low confidence that the errors were actually
present in the original story as compared to their confidence in correctly
recalled elements. Reconstructive theory makes the contrary prediction
that, since the constructive errors are generated in the same way as correct
recall, (mistaken) confidence in predicted constructive errors should be
at least as great as confidence in what is correct (i.e., constructive
errors should not be easily detectable, as they were in Gauld & Stephenson,
1967). Furthermore, the predicted constructive errors have their origin
solely in the internal cognitive processing of the subject, whereas many of
the correct aspects of recall are imposed on the subject by the experi-
menter and may, therefore, not be consistent with the subject's cognitive
structures (e.g., if the information is illogical). Therefore, as the
process of assimilation increases with time, the more internally consistent
and personally generated constructive errors may be assigned higher con-
fidence ratings than the correct experimenter-presented original story
elements.
A comparison of the average confidence ratings for correct aspects of
recall (only for aspects of the structural balance triad, i.e., the part
of the story dealing with the "having children" issue) versus confidence
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ratings for constructive errors is presented in Table 6. Any subject who
Insert Table 6 about here
had a constructive error score with absolute values equal to four or five
was included in the analysis. The conscious fabrication hypothesis would
predict that recall errors of greater magnitude should be most easily
detectable. Therefore, requiring large constructive error scores for inclu-
sion in the analysis (absolute values of four or five) provides a conserva-
tive test of the normal reconstruction (non-fabrication) alternate hypothe-
sis. The average confidence rating for correct elements is an average of
the confidence ratings for all sentences which were not given error recall
scores greater than one. Subjects in the "cognitive interaction" condition
who made constructive errors under the present criterion did not differ in
their average confidence for correct aspects from "cognitive interaction"
subjects who did not make constructive errors (the data are presented below).
At the three week and six week delay intervals, significantly more
subjects in the "cognitive interaction-contradictory" condition had higher
confidence in their constructive errors than their average confidence for
correct recall, ten to two with one tie at three weeks and ten to two at
six weeks (p < .04 using the low power two-tailed sign test). The mean
confidence was slightly higher and three of four subjects had higher confi-
dence in correct aspects at the two-day interval, but the sample is too
small to draw any conclusions (p > .05 by the sign test or t = -1.75,
p > .05). The slight depression in confidence in constructive errors at
the 2-day delay could reflect an unverbalizable awareness that something
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was different about the errors (something was), or that "left-to-be-derived"
markers were still generally available (see the General Discussion). In
any case there is no reason to suspect that the errors even at the two-day
delay were guesses since a) the errors were of the same kind as later
occurred with high confidence, and b) the confidence is considerably greater
than the confidence of "memory" subjects in their errors (see the analy-
sis immediately below).
Further evidence for the contention that the constructive errors in
the cognitive interaction-contradictory condition are not gap-filling
guesses is provided by comparison with the relative level of confidence
ratings of errors in the memory condition (where Reconstructive Theory.
predicts true constructive errors should not occur). Only seven "memory"
subjects received error scores greater than three. The sign of the dif-
ference between average error score on correct items and error score for
errors clearly tends to be in a different direction for the memory condi-
tion than for the cognitive-interaction condition. Using the difference
between average confidence for correct information and (mistaken) confidence
in errors as the dependent variable, the "cognitive interaction-contradic-
tory-3 and 6 week delay" and the "memory" conditions were compared (the one
two-day memory subject was included to increase sample size since the error
confidence was one of the higher ones: 6.0). Using a Behrens-Fisher t-
test with a Welch correction for degrees of freedom (Games & Klare, 1967),
the difference in the differences was significant, t'(6') = 4.18, p < .005.
The difference for the memory condition was significantly above zero
[t(6) = 3.71, p < .005] and it has already been shown with the sign test
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that the trend of differences is in the opposite direction for "cognitive
interaction-contradictory-3 and 6 week" subjects,
The conclusion is inescapable--the "memory" subjects are already aware
of and able to detect their errors (since average confidence in correct
aspects is significantly greater than confidence in errors), replicating
Gauld and Stephenson (1967). The "cognitive interaction-contradictory"
subjects at three and six week delay were not only unable to differentiate
the constructive errors from the correct aspects of their recalls, but more
had higher confidence in the constructive errors (in relation to confi-
dence in correct aspects) than had lower confidence.
What were the errors that the memory subjects made, if not construc-
tive errors? Five of the errors seemed to be reinforcing errors. This is
illustrated by importing information which superseded the balance triad but
preserved the state of balance of the overall story; for example, recalling
correctly that Bob and Margie disagreed about having a baby and importing
the information that even if they had agreed on that issue, they still had
many other issues they did not agree on. These kinds of reinforcing errors
even occurred twice when contradictory ancillary information was presented,
providing further support for the contention that to-be-remembered connec-
ted discourse is processed in such a way as to be immune from assimilative
effects of subsequent related information (thereby resulting in abstrac-
tive-trace type recall and "freezing" effects). Of the other two errors,
one changed the relations of an imbalanced story so as to make it balanced
(even though no contradictory information was presented) and only one was
a predicted reconciling error in a contradictory ancillary information
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condition (29 of the 39 constructive error scores greater than three in the
cognitive interaction condition were of the predicted reconciling contra-
dictory ancillary information type, and all of the error scores greater
than three in cognitive interaction-contradictory conditions were reconciling
rather than reinforcing).
Finally, it should be noted that confidence in correct aspects of
recall was approximately the same for those who did not make constructive
errors (means of 7.86, 7.23, and 6.92 for the two day, three week, and
six week delay intervals, respectively) as it was for those who did (see
Table 6). For the cognitive interaction conditions other than "contra-
dictory," there were six subjects with constructive error scores greater
than three for whom average confidence in correct aspects minus confidence
in constructive errors was positive and four such subjects for whom the
difference was negative, suggesting indifferentiability of constructive
errors from correct aspects for these conditions.
Level of Recall
Since the experimental hypotheses did not involve the quantity re-
called, a sophisticated protocol analysis for these purposes was not per-
formed. However, on the basis of an "idea units" sub-division, it was
found that less of the story (not including the part represented by the
structural balance triads of Figure 1) was recalled with increasing inter-
vals of delay, slightly (but nonsignificantly) more of imbalanced than
balanced stories was recalled, and there were no other significant differ-
ences or interactions for any other conditions. Furthermore, for those
subjects whose constructive error scores were greater than three (absolute
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values), amount recalled was approximately equal to the amount recalled
by subjects not making constructive errors (comparing within the same level
of delay).
General Discussion
In Reconstructive Theory the nature of the proposed cognitive struc-
tures necessitates, under certain conditions, that the act of remembering
involves inferentially determining the past state of those structures on
the basis of their present states. Recall can be correct when the past
and present schematic states have a relation such that the personal rules
for inference are appropriate, which usually requires some kind of "con-
sistency" between the states. Recall may be erroneous when the rules for
inference are, unbeknownst to the rememberer, inappropriate (usually in
cases of schematic states which have changed so as to become "inconsis-
tent"). When relevant schemata are altered in such a way that their states
at recall are inconsistent with some known residues of their states at
comprehension (e.g., details from the stories), the process of inferential
reconstruction will assume worldly orderliness and reconcile the inconsis-
tency. Such reconciliation will lead to substantial error resulting from
processes operative at recall. Conscious forgetting, "I don't remember,"
can occur when the rememberer has sufficient knowledge in present schemata
to allow awareness that his/her personal inference rules will not allow
satisfactory reconstruction (usually when information in present schemata
indicates altered schematic states, contains the knowledge that the past
states evolved into the present states in some way contradictory to that
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on which the inference rules are based, and no appropriate new inference
rule is available). The same processes underly correct recall, erroneous
recall, and "forgetting" according to Reconstructive Theory. These pro-
cesses are elaborated in the SOS Model below.
All of the results of the present experiment conclusively supported
the predictions of Reconstructive Theory. When cognitive interaction was
induced, a priori specifiable substantial errors of a reconciling type were
evident. These errors occurred mainly when ancillary information was pre-
sented contradicting expectations based on the interaction of information
from the story and prior knowledge regarding interpersonal relations (but
not contradicting any story elements). These errors were neither the
retrieved outcomes of inferential processing at comprehension (e.g.,
Frederiksen, 1975a,b) nor conscious fabrications to fill gaps in memory
(e.g., Gauld & Stephenson, 1967). Evidence against the former includes
the facts that the set of predicted constructive errors were not legitimate
inferences based on the text alone (and do not occur in the "none" and
"consistent" conditions) and that the predicted constructive errors were
considerably less prevalent for short than longer recall delay. That they
are not guesses seems clearly demonstrated by the finding that subjects
tended to be more confident, at three and six week delayed recall, that
the predicted reconciling constructive errors were actually present in the
original story than they were confident regarding elements of their recall
which really were in the original story. Also, the level of recall for
those making and not making constructive errors was the same (Frederiksen's
criterion, 1975a,b). The errors are also not the result of demand
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characteristics due to the initial cognitive-interaction cover story. At
recall, it was made clear to the subjects that the experimenter really was
only interested in memory, that they should recall only what was in the
story written on the bright yellow piece of paper, and that their opinions,
impressions, reactions, etc. should be excluded.
It was contended that in conventional memory experiments various fac-
tors (e.g., the demand characteristics of the situation, the nature of
typical materials, and the isolated context in which the discourses are
presented) have the effect of minimizing the interaction with pre-existing
cognitive structures (to the amount necessary for a plausible and consis-
tent semantic representation) and minimizing the likelihood of subsequent
schema modification. Since occurrences of these two factors are necessary
prerequisites for reconstructive errors, it was argued that such errors
as were found under the "cognitive-interaction" condition should not be
present in the recalls of subjects under conditions of a conventional memory
experiment. This hypothesis was also clearly confirmed. The results indi-
cated that the TBR discourse did maintain a "particular identity immune
from the assimilative effects of prior knowledge or subsequently encountered
related information." However, as was demonstrated earlier, accuracy in
recall under these conditions is consistent with Reconstructive Theory.
It should also be noted that only an infinitesimal proportion of the
context effects (which produce the greater interaction with cognitive struc-
tures and schematic modification which lead to reconstructive errors) that
are likely to be relevant in language processing and recall in everyday
life were operative, even in the "cognitive interaction-contradictory"
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condition. Thus, the extent of reconstructive error in the present experi-
ment can still be expected to significantly underestimate that which occurs
in everyday life. The utility of conventional memory for connected dis-
course experiments is therefore called into question. The advantages of
increased control should be sought only when results lead to conclusions
which differ only in degree from conclusions which would be derived from
more natural contexts. However, as the results of the present study indi-
cate, the view of memorial functioning derived from conventional experi-
ments is a qualitative distortion of that found with a minimal simulation
of normally occurring contingencies.
An Interpretation of Previous Research Using the Orientation of Reconstruc-
tive Theory
A consistent interpretation of diverse results in the memory area is
possible relying simply on the notion of differential interaction with
cognitive structures and some of the other precepts of Reconstructive
Theory.
The simplest matter is accounting for the data supporting abstractive-
trace retrieval approaches to recall of connected discourse--i.e., all
discourse memory studies with the exception of Bartlett. Since a compre-
hensive account of these results based on Reconstructive Theory has already
been presented, presentation of the arguments here would be superfluous.
Bartlett (1932) found substantial gross error in recall even though
the level of cognitive interaction induced by the instructions would not
be expected to be greater than for the other discourse memory experiments
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(contrary to popular belief, Bartlett did use conventional memory instruc-
tions, see p. 66). The explanation is that the stories Bartlett used were
strange to his subjects and in many places illogical or incomprehensible
to them. The result is that a greater degree of interaction with cognitive
structures was necessary merely to achieve a minimum plausible and consis-
tent semantic reading (i.e., to minimally understand what the stories were
about). Hence the increase in constructive errors.
Bransford and Franks' (1971) finding in a conventional memory experi-
ment that holistic ideas which were never presented are recognized with
greater confidence than parts of the ideas actually presented is possible
with only minimal interaction with cognitive structures. Given the high
level of redundancy of the materials at the semantic level (the same ideas
occurring in different combinations), minimum effort after meaning would
lead to identical semantic representations. It is consistent with Recon-
structive Theory that these identical representations should not be stored
independently each time they occur in another combination.
The tendency to differentiate to-be-remembered stimulus materials
from other knowledge in laboratory memory experiments helps to explain the
findings in verbal learning regarding extra-experimental interference
(Underwood & Postman, 1963) and encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson,
1973). In experiments with isolated verbal materials there is not even a
necessity for minimal schematic interaction since the "aboutness" of the
materials need not be decided. Hence a conclusion like that of Slamecka
(1966), that experimenter-provided associations in lists are differentiated
from pre-experimental associations and that the latter are not unlearned
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due to interference from list associations,is consistent with the orienta-
tion in the present research. Tulving and Thomson (1973) concluded that
information about presented word lists are stored in a location distinct
from the normal associative structure, also correspondent with Reconstruc-
tive Theory.
The implications that differentiation of test materials from knowledge
structures has for those working in the area of "semantic memory" should be
clear. For example, consider the methodology which is the basis for
Anderson and Bower's (1973) Human Associative Memory model of sentence
recall. After presenting a list of sentences to the subject, he or she is
asked whether a certain sentence (e.g., "The hippie touched the debutante
in the park.") was part of the presented list. If the subject had not
really seen a hippie touching a debutante in the park, but had seen the
sentence, the appropriate response would be positive. If a subject did
happen to have seen a hippie touching a debutante in the park, but that
sentence was not on the presented list, the correct response would have to
be negative. In other words, what is tested has nothing to do with what
the subject knows. The subject must disregard his knowledge since it may
conflict with the arbitrary sentences presented, and the latter determine
what is a correct response. This obviously has nothing to do with "seman-
tic" memory in any of the senses in which that term is meaningfully
employed.
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A Preliminary Sketch of a Process Model of Reconstructive Memory (the SOS
flodel)
Substantial preliminary work on a model of reconstructive memory has
been completed. The flow chart in Figure 2 is a sketch of the model as it
would specifically apply in the case of subjects in the "cognitive inter-
action--imbalanced and married (contradictory)" condition of the present
experiment. Many details are omitted, as well as explication of some
assumptions, algorithms for generating context-dependent SOSs for specific
situations, the role of conscious "left-to-be-derived" markers, and other
issues. The presentation here is intended solely as an illustration. For
a more general and complete account of the model in its current state,
see Spiro (in press).
Insert Figure 2 about here
The building block of the model is the "State of Schema" (SOS). SOS
is a representation of a sub-set of the information hypothesized to be
stored in a schema (or a set of related schemata). The information can be,
among other things, specific details from a story, general impressions or
summary statements (e.g., expectations regarding state of balance of out-
comes), general types of events that have occurred in prototypal situa-
tions, and rules for inferential reconstruction. It should be noted that
the form of molecular representation (e.g., propositional, graph-theoretic,
etc.) is irrelevant at this time. In what follows, only paths leading to
reconstructive errors will be described at first.
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Figure 2 looks at SOS(S) (the state of the schema for the imbalanced
story) after the story has been comprehended and some time has passed.
SOS(S) is by now assimilated into the schema (schemata) relevant to events
(rather than rules) regarding interpersonal relations in general [SOS(IRG-E)],
giving SOS(S) at time 1 [SOS(S 1)]: SOS(S) => SOS(IRG-E) = {SOS(S)/
[SOS(IRG-E]} = SOS(S 1). The information that might be stored in SOS(S 1)
includes the following:
(1) negative outcome
(2) important issue: having children (weighted)
a) disagreement (weighted)
b) Bob does not want children
(3) other facts and details from the story (e.g., the fact that
Bob and Margie are engaged).
The issue "having children" in the context "engaged" is assigned a weight
by referring to the "rules" component of SOS(IRG), i.e., SOS(IRG-R), pro-
bably in combination with an actuarial consultation of SOS(IRG-E) (to
determine what most engaged couples have said and done vis 9 vis the issue).
The rules might include:
R : In the context "to-be-married," assign the weight a
(for most people, some high value) if there is dis-
agreement on the issue "having children."
R2 : Outcome values [negative for this example] are more
important than states regarding issues.
Inferential Reconstruction
58
R3: Reduce a by some constant (to a') if the state of the
issue is negative (i.e., disagreement) and the outcome
is positive [i.e., the disagreement is less important
if things work out all right; since the outcome is nega-
tive in this story, the "importance of the disagreement"
weight stays a].
Rule 3 is a consequence of Rule 2. The importance weight assigned to the
disagreement about having children will subsequently help determine what
kind of error is likely to occur in recall. .. Indi-
vidual differences are probably quite large in the determination of a
(as they probably are in assigning weights and criterion values throughout
the model).
The extent of disagreement [2a in SOS(SI)] is also assigned a weight
(b) based primarily on the story, but likely also affected by the importance
weight (a). Disagreement that is considered less important is probably
also perceived as being of lesser degree (i.e., the disagreers are not as
far apart).
In 2b of SOS(SI), the valence of only one relation of the disagree-
ment (Bob--"having children") is assumed to be stored, since the valence of
the Margie--"having children" relation is derivable on the basis of 2a and
2b. Whether derivable information is stored, and which elements are left
to be derived are also subject to individual differences, probably.
Assume now that the contradictory ancillary information ("they did
get married") has been received and some time has passed. At time 2, SOS(S)
will now contain the information in #3, SOS(S2). The outcome, (1) in
SOS(S 1), is changed to positive.
Inferential Reconstruction
59
The "importance of the disagreement" weight (a), and the "extent of
disagreement" weight (b) are combined to form a composite value,
cc = f(a,b)]. SOS(IRG-R) is then referred to for determination of a thres-
hold value z, which is the value of c necessary to conclude that the dis-
agreement must have been dissolved for the outcome "got married" to have
occurred (in the absence of other information). High values of z will be
generated when individuals think agreement about having children is essential
to agreement about "getting married," and low values of z will be generated
when it is considered nonessential. If c < z, it is inferred that they
must no longer disagree, and 2a is changed in SOS(S2) from "disagree" to
"agree." If c > z, 2a in SOS(S2) remains "disagreed," but the weights of
"importance of the disagreement" and "extent of the disagreement (a and b,
respectively) are reduced (to a' and b') according to Rules R2 and R3 from
SOS(IRG-R), since the outcome is now positive.
More time passes, and recall is attempted at t3. SOS(S3) is the same
as SOS(S2), except assimilation with SOS(IRG-E), is increased. I.e., the
boundaries between SOS(S2) and SOS(IRG-E), the latter being in interactive
relation with SOS(IRG-R), are less clearly defined. Reconstruction of events
involving interpersonal relations relies first on the following rule from
SOS(IRG-R):
R4: Events must be consistent with outcomes (though not
necessarily vice versa), particularly when outcome
information is more chronologically recent (as it is
here), unless there are reasons for the inconsistency.
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The outcome information of (1) in SOS(S3) is then compared with detail
information, (2) and (3), of SOS(S3). If 2a has been changed to "agree"
(c < z at t2), consistency will be found. Recall will then be a straight-
forward output based on SOS(S3). A likely constructive error is that
Margie originally did not want children (if 2b is only "Bob didn't want
children," with the Margie--"having children" relation left to be derived).
Another likely constructive error is that Bob or Margie had a change of
mind about the issue (if both of the relations with "having children" remain
in stored form in 2b; i.e. they were not automatically changed when 2a
was changed--the subject might think something like "they used to disagree
and now I know they agree, so someone had a change of mind").
If inconsistency is found (i.e., if 2a is still "disagree"), inferen-
tial reconstruction proceeds as follows. Previously encountered types of
situations involving engaged or married couples are generated from
SOS(IRG-E) in a general (unlabeled as to participants) form. Generation
is determined by similarities to the details remaining in (2) and (3) of
SOS(S3) and by some index of commonness of occurrence (a function of the
number of labeled instances of the general type). Each generated type of
situation is analyzed for its reconciling power for the (R4-based) incon-
sistency of SOS(S3). The reconciling power is then assigned a value (d),
based on calculations in SOS(IRG-R). The value of d is then compared to
a criterion value (Y). The latter value is a constant plus a variable
which is a function of the experiment's accuracy set (Brockway, Chmielewski,
& Cofer, 1974). When a premium is placed on accuracy, Y will be larger
(better reconciliation is required). If d > Y, the reconciliation is clear
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(i.e., easily derivable). Any time the reconciliation is so easily deriv-
able from (and totally consistent with) stored information, the rememberer
simply assumes that another case of not attending to easily derivable
information has occurred. The rememberer will then insert the reconciling
generated information in recall. An example of how this might work is by
generating a common situation where many couples had areas of disagreement
with approximately the same importance and extent weights as the (now
lowered) a' and b' of SOS(S3). For these couples, their areas of agreement
outweighed the area of disagreement and allowed a happy married life. The
constructive recall error that would result might be something like "they
disagreed, but their positions were not too far apart and the issue was
not that important to them anyway, so other areas (of agreement) were more
important and had a greater effect on their plans and life together."
If for the first generated general situation d < Y, another situation
is generated and the new value of d is compared to a slightly increased
value of Y (due to its less typical nature and fewer elements in common
with stored details of the story). This process continues until a d > Y
situation is found or until w generations are made. The value of w also
depends on the accuracy set of the experiment. If the importance of accuracy
is stressed, w will be a small value. After w unsuccessful generations,
the rememberer will probably indicate that he or she has "forgotten." The
type of process outlined above is assumed to be a common one, and therefore
not a conscious indication to the subject of likely error.
What about recall without reconstructive errors? This will tend to
occur under the following conditions (among others): SOS(S) 1> SOS(IRG)
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(lack of assimilation and, therefore, lack of a base for subsequent genera-
tion at recall);not relating contradictory outcome information to SOS(S1)
or not having contradictory information to relate (leaving nothing to re-
concile at t3); under "memory" instructions (where both of the former two
reasons are operative); under cognitive interaction instructions with "none"
or consistent ancillary information (since the second reason is operative).
Also, a "left-to-be-derived" marker may be stored (see Spiro, in press).
It seems likely that the marker is easily lost over time (possibly because
it is extraneous and not directly related to the topical content of schemata
it is a part of). Accurate recall without reconstructive error (as was
more likely for the "cognitive interaction-contradictory" condition at the
two-day delay interval) may then occur when relevant "left to be derived"
markers are still generally accessible, and, therefore, absence of such a
marker is not assumed by default to indicate that one did exist even if
criterion values are surpassed; or presence of some markers may increase
Y.
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Although the research of Kintsch and his associates has emphasized
the non-reconstructive aspects of discourse memory, the possibility of
reconstruction has been acknowledged (e.g., Kintsch, et al., 1975).
2
Loftus and Palmer (1974) did demonstrate effects of schema modifica-
tion subsequent to presentation. Their study, although complementary to
the present one, is not directly relevant. The former research involved
TBR visual scenes. The representation was then manipulated verbally. The
erroneous recall results can be interpretable as demonstrating the dominance
of verbal codes in guiding recall of visual events. Alternatively, the
verbal information can be considered by subjects to be a correction of
their existing representation, an interpretation not possible in the pre-
sent study.
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Table 1
Predicted Constructive Errors
Bob(P) Margie(O)
c 0
0
Having Children(X)
Imbalancing errors (-)
divergence in original valence
(e.g., "Bob wanted to have
children and Margie didn't," for
the balanced story) or in valence
at a later time (e.g., "Bob later
changed his mind and fought with
Margie about having children,"
for the balanced story)
change in the feasibility of X
toward divergence (e.g., "for
some reason they became aware
that it was impossible for them
to have children, and this fact
made them very uhhappy")
Error types Balancing errors (+)
convergence in valence with res-
pect to original or subsequent
attitude (e.g., "Margie agreed"
[or "later changed her mind and
agreed"] with Bob about not
having children," for the imbal-
anced story) or intentions (e.g.,
"Margie decided she would try to
have children soon," for the
balanced story)
change in the feasibility of X
toward convergence (e.g., "the
problem was resolved when they
found out that Margie couldn't
have children anyway")
divergence ih the relative impor-
tance of the relations to X (e.g.,
"they disagreed, but Bob felt
very strongly about the issue and
for Margie it was not so Impor-
tant") or a lessening in the
importance of X for both of them
(e.g., "it was not a very impor-
tant matter to either of them and
was therefore easily resolvable")
P-X, O-X
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Table 1 (continued)
Error types
P-O
relative to
P-X, O-X
P-O
Other
situations
Overriding
principle
Imbalancing errors (-)
change in the negative direction,
either in the degree of affect
(e.g., "Bob began to realize he
didn't like Margie as much as he
thought he did") or the degree of
unity (e.g., "Bob and Margie
began to see less and less of
each other")
importation of an imbalanced
situation, specific or general
(e.g., "they had many other
serious areas of disagreement")
e.g., "the prospect of marriage
is not considered as ideal as it
once was"
Balancing errors (+)
increase in weight (e.g., "their
feelings for each other were much
more important than how they felt
about any issue")
change in the positive
(e.g., "Bob's love for
continually at a rapid
direction
Margie grew
rate")
importation of a balanced situation,
specific or general (e.g., "they
had the same attitude on almost
everything")
e.g., "everybody argues and it
doesn't mean anything"
. .. . T . . . . . .
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Table 3
Mean Constructive Error Scores for the "Cognitive Interaction"
Condition as a Function of Type of Story and
Type of Ancillary Information
Type of ancillary information
None Consistent Contradictory
Balanced .13 .47 -2.57
Type of story
Imbalanced .43 -.16 2.47
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Structural balance representations of an aspect of the
balanced and imbalanced stories.
Figure 2. An SOS Model of inferential reconstruction. (See text
for explication.)


